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Adorno begins his Drei Studien zu Hegel with a rebuttal of the traditional question 
about Hegel: what is dead and what is still alive in Hegel’s thought? Such a question pre-
supposes an arrogant position of ourselves as judges of the past; when we are dealing 
with a truly great philosopher, the question to be raised is not what can this philosopher 
still tell us, what does he mean to us, but the opposite one, what are WE, our contempo-
rary situation, in his eyes, how would our epoch appear to his thought. And the same 
should be done with Faust: our question should not be what does the Faust myth still 
tell us, but how does our own predicament appear when it is seen through the lenses 
of the Faust myth. This is what Busoni does: his Faust provides a diagnosis of a certain 
historical moment, his as well as ours.
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Abstract
Busoni’s Doktor Faust is a melancholic Trauerspiel 
that returns to the tradition of Puppenspiele. Bu-
soni’s unfinished score is the result of an inherent 
creative deadlock rather than an external accident. 
The ambiguity of the young boy who appears at 
the end as a reincarnation of Faust’s Wille remains 
unexplored in Busoni.
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Busoni takes as his premise the irreducible gap between singing and action that 
characterizes conventional opera: the absurdity of people singing on stage while pre-
tending to be engaged in ordinary human actions. But the conclusion he draws from it 
is the opposite of the expected one—not that music should adapt to the reality of action, 
but that the action on stage should adapt to music by way of being pointedly artificial, 
improbable, magical, untrue:
The sung word on the stage will always remain a convention and an obstacle to the 
genuine affect of opera. In order to emerge with honor from this conflict, a plot in 
which characters sing while acting will, from the beginning, have to be gauged to 
the incredible, the untrue, and the improbable. In thus mutually supporting each 
other, the two impossibilities become possible and acceptable.
The fact that we experience the stage singing as a convention which prevents genu-
ine affect is in itself a sign of the change in historical sensibility: the ‘objective spirit’ of 
Busoni’s time made another romantic-realist Faust in the line of Gounod impossible. This 
is why Busoni returned to the Renaissance, a return already discernible in the dramatic 
construction of his Faust: he wrote a ‘foreshortened’ libretto which lacks continuity, i.e., 
which does not aim at telling the whole story, but offers only a succession of selected 
cross-sections—his unit is a Bild, the image of a decisive segment, not an Akt, the organic 
unity of action. As if to make this point clear, he left out the best known and dramatically 
most effective episode (Gretchen’s seduction), referring to it only in absentia, in a brief 
Intermezzo where Gretchen’s brother searches for Faust to kill him in revenge for his ruin-
ing her. No wonder such a procedure evokes Brechtian echoes—like Brecht, Busoni also 
emphasized the need for Entfremdung: ‘Just as the artist, if he wants to move others, must 
not let himself be moved (if he is not to lose control over his means at the crucial moment), 
the audience, if it wants to savor the theatrical effect, must not confuse it with reality. Oth-
erwise, the aesthetic pleasure deteriorates into human compassion.’ In exactly the same 
way as in the case of the tension between music and action, the two impossibilities—the 
artist’s impossibility of being directly identified with, moved by, his work, and the audi-
ence’s impossibility of confusing stage with reality—mutually cancel themselves.
Busoni’s return to the Renaissance is more complex than it may appear: he doesn’t 
simply ignore Goethe—quite the contrary, what he ignores are all previous operatic ver-
sions of Faust (Berlioz, Gounod, Boito—the last undoubtedly the best) which intervene 
between Goethe and him. Busoni enters directly in a dialogue with the great Genius 
himself: in the Prologue Vor dem Vorhang, to be spoken by the poet to the spectators, he 
evokes Goethe as the supreme version of Faust, and, admitting his limitations, modestly 
withdraws to Puppenspiele:
Doch was vermächt’, gen Zauberer, ein Meister!
Des Menschen Lied am Göttlichen verschallt:
Also belehrt erkannt’ ich meine Ziele
Und wandte mich zurück – zum Puppenspiele.
There is, of course, an element of fakery in this modesty—his step back is, to put it 
with Lenin, a step backwards aimed at enabling two steps forward. In Benjaminian terms, 
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what Busoni does is go back from symbol to allegory: from organic dramatic unity to 
parataxis, to the succession of tableaux vivants. This formal change brings about the 
change in the basic attitude of the work from tragic mourning to melancholy. In a fa-
mous passage from his letter to Schiller from August 16/17, 1797, Goethe reports on an 
experience of his which made him perceive a piece of ruined reality as a symbol:
My grandfather's house, its courtyard and its gardens had been transformed from 
the parochial-patrician home of an old Frankfurt elder into the most useful trading 
and market place by wisely enterprising people. Curious coincidence during the 
bombardment conspired to see the structure perish, but even today, reduced, for 
the most part, to a pile of rubble, it is still worth twice as much as the current owners 
paid my family for it 11 years ago. Conceivably, the whole thing may, in the future, 
be bought and restored by yet another entrepreneur, and you can easily see thast it 
would, in more than one sense, stand as a symbol of thousands of other instances, 
in this industrious city and in particular in my own eyes.1
The contrast between allegory and symbol is crucial here. Allegory is melancholic: 
as Freud pointed out, a melancholic treats an object which is still here as already lost, 
i.e., melancholy is a pre-emptive mourning. So, in an allegorical approach, one looks at 
a busy market-place house and already sees in it the future ruins it will turn into—ruins 
are the ‘truth’ of the proud house we see. Recall the old Catholic strategy of guarding 
men against the temptations of the flesh: when you see a voluptuous feminine body in 
front of you, imagine how it will look in a couple of decades—the dried skin, sagging 
breasts . . . . (Or, even better, imagine what already lurks now beneath the skin: raw flesh 
and bones, inner fluids, half-digested food and excrement . . . . ) This is melancholy at 
its purest—no wonder that one of the fashions among the rich in the Romantic era was 
to build new houses directly as ruins, with parts of the walls missing, etc.
Goethe, however, does the exact opposite: he sees (the potential for) the future 
prosperity in the present pile of rubble. (In a somewhat pathetic way, one could say the 
same about the ruins of 9/11: a melancholic would see in them the ‘truth’ of the arrogant 
dreams of US grandeur, i.e., he would already see in the Twin Towers themselves the ruins 
that lie ahead, while a Goethean optimist would see in the ruins of 9/11 a symbol of the 
enterprising spirit of that other ‘industrious city’ who will soon replace the ruins with 
new buildings.) Crucial here is the rise of the symbol from ruin and repetition: Goethe’s 
grandfather’s house was not a symbol for its first generation dwellers—as Heidegger 
would have put it, for them, it was just a zuhandenes object, part of their environs with 
which they were engaged. It was only its destruction, the reduction to a pile of rubble, 
that made it appear as a symbol. (There is a temporal ambiguity in Goethe’s last sentence: 
will the house become a symbol when it will be renovated, or is it a symbol already now, 
for the one who is able to see in it the future of its renewal?) Meaning—allegorical or 
symbolic—arises only through destruction, through an out-of-joint experience, through 
a cut which interrupts the object’s direct functioning in our environs.
1 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, ‘Brief an Friedrich Schiller, 16./17. August 1797,’ in Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche, 
sec. 2, vol. 4 Goethe mit Schiller. Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche vom 24. Juni 1794 bis zum 9. Mai 1805, ed. Volker C. Dörr and 
Norbert Oellers, Part 1: Vom 24. Juni 1794 bis zum 31. Dezember 1799, Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1998, p. 390.
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So if Goethe’s Faust is one big Symbol, if Faust's failures themselves are so to speak 
premature successes, complications of the ongoing process of Bildung which point 
towards their future redemption, Busoni's Faust is an allegory in which the ongoing 
triumphs are already accompanied by the shadow of the final defeat. If Goethe's Faust 
is an optimistic tragedy, Busoni's is a melancholic Trauerspiel in which the highest act, 
the only successful one, is to fully accept one's failure. A puppet is a figure of such 
melancholy. That is to say, what does a puppet (more precisely: a marionette) stand for 
as a subjective stance? One should turn here to Heinrich von Kleist's essay Über das 
Marionettentheater from 18102, which is crucial with regard to his relationship to Kant’s 
philosophy (we know that the reading of Kant threw Kleist into a shattering spiritual 
crisis - this reading was THE traumatic encounter of his life). Where, in Kant, do we find 
the term ‘Marionette’? In a mysterious subchapter of his Critique of Practical Reason 
entitled ‘Of the Wise Adaptation of Man’s Cognitive Faculties to His Practical Vocation,’ 
in which he endeavours to answer the question of what would happen to us if we were 
to gain access to the noumenal domain, to the Ding an sich:
/ . . . /instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with incli-
nations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually 
won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our 
eyes./. . . /Thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few 
would be done from hope, none from duty. The moral worth of actions, on which 
alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of supreme 
wisdom, would not exist at all. The conduct of man, so long as his nature remained 
as it is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, 
everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures.3
So, for Kant, the direct access to the noumenal domain would deprive us of the very 
‘spontaneity’ which forms the kernel of transcendental freedom: it would turn us into 
lifeless automata, or, to put it in today’s terms, into ‘thinking machines . . .’—What Kleist 
does is to present the obverse of this horror: the bliss and grace of marionettes, the 
creatures who have direct access to the noumenal divine dimension, who are directly 
guided by it. For Kleist, marionettes display the perfection of spontaneous, unconscious 
movements: they have only one center of gravity, their movements are controlled from 
only one point. The puppeteer has control only of this point, and as he moves it in a 
simple straight line, the limbs of the marionettes follow inevitably and naturally because 
the figure of the marionette is completely coordinated. Was it not already Heiner Müller 
who, in his Bayreuth staging of Tristan, read it as a Puppenspiel, emphasizing the me-
chanical movement of characters in a geometric space? Puppenspiel and passion are far 
from opposed: when I am wholly in the thrall of a passion, I am no longer the agent of 
my activity, it is the impersonal passion which acts through me.
Marionettes thus symbolize beings of innocent, pristine nature: they respond 
naturally and gracefully to divine guidance, in contrast to ordinary humans who have 
to struggle constantly with their ineradicable propensity to Evil, which is the price 
2 Reprinted in vol. 5 of Heinrich von Kleist. Gesamtausgabe, München: dtv 1969.
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, New York: Macmillan 1956, p. 152-153.
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they have to pay for their freedom. This grace of the marionettes is underscored by 
their apparent weightlessness: they hardly touch the floor—they are not bound to the 
earth, for they are drawn up from above. They represent a state of grace, a paradise 
lost to man, whose willful ‘free’ self-assertions make him self-conscious. The dancer 
exemplifies this fallen state of man: he is not upheld from above, but, rather, feels 
himself bound to the earth, and yet must appear weightless in order to perform his 
feats with apparent ease. He must try consciously to attain grace, which is why the 
effect of his dance is affectation rather than grace. Therein resides the paradox of 
man: he is neither an animal wholly immersed in the earthly surroundings, nor the 
angelic marionette gracefully floating in the air, but a free being who, due to his very 
freedom, feels the unbearable pressure that attracts and ties him to the earth where 
he ultimately does not belong.
It is from this tragic split that one should read figures like Kätchen von Heilbronn 
from Kleist’s play of the same name, this fairy-tale figure of a woman who wanders 
through life with angelic equanimity: like a marionette, she is guided from above and 
fulfills her glorious destiny by merely following the spontaneous assertions of her heart. 
What Kleist is not able to confront is not only the fact that such an angelic position is 
impossible due to human finitude, but also the more disturbing fact that, if this posi-
tion were to be realized, it would amount to its opposite, to a horrible, lifeless machine. 
The very metaphor Kleist uses (marionette) is tell-tale: in order for it to function, Kleist 
has to exclude the machine-like aspect of it so strongly present in E.T.A. von Hoffman’s 
Sandmann.
How does Busoni’s Faust fit these coordinates? As with every great mythic figure, each 
epoch invents its own Faust. Today, Faust is predominantly read in a Heideggerian way, 
as the symbol of the hubris of subjectivity, of a nihilistic pact with the devil the subject 
concludes in order to gain unlimited power. The lesson of this Faust is best rendered by 
the vulgar proverb ‘you cannot urinate against the wind’: a plea for moderation, for the 
proper measure. This Faust perfectly fits the postmodern celebration of human finitude: 
his failure can stand for the ‘Dialektik der Aufklärung,’ for the failure of all big modern 
projects, from the political totalitarianism into which the Communist dream of a fully 
self-transparent society degenerated to ecological catastrophies as the consequence of 
the dream of the human domination over nature. Although, in Goethe, things appear 
much more ambiguous—at the end, Faust not only finds peace, but finds it without re-
nouncing his activity—he dies happy, in the middle of colonizing/reforming activity—, 
the basic coordinates remain the same.
With Busoni, however, we enter a totally different field: his Faust is not a ‘Faus-
tian’ larger-than-life heroic figure who pays the price for his hubris; he is, to put it in 
Nietzsche’s terms, a slave pretending to be a master but not ready to pay the price for 
it. When Mephistopheles’s voice tempts him to conclude the pact, Faust is aware that 
he is exposing himself to danger: ‘Welchem Wahn gab ich mich hin!/Arbeit,/heilende 
Weile,/in dir bade ich mich rein.’ However, he quickly succumbs to the temptations 
and abandons the heilende Weile of true knowledge. Faust does not stand for the hard 
work of science—science avec patience, as Arthur Rimbaud put it—but for the cheap 
trickery of magic; he is not ready to heroically assume his Will, but wants others to do 
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it for him. He is not a figure of unconditional Will, but a figure of the betrayal of the 
truly autonomous Will.
This is Busoni’s implicit diagnosis of our predicament. On today’s market, we find a 
whole series of products deprived of their malignant properties: coffee without caffeine, 
cream without fat, beer without alcohol . . . . And the list goes on: what about virtual sex 
as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, 
of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the 
art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today’s tolerant liberal 
multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized 
Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach 
to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight . . . )? Virtual Reality simply 
generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides 
reality itself deprived of its substance, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real—in the 
same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the 
real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one.
Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can 
enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. Today’s 
hedonism combines pleasure with constraint—it is no longer the old notion of the 
‘right measure’ between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian im-
mediate coincidence of opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing 
which causes damage should already be the medicine. The ultimate example of it is 
arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction ‘Do 
you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!’, i.e., of the very thing which causes 
constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner’s famous ‘Only the spear 
which caused the wound can heal it’ from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the 
hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main 
forms: drugs, free sex, smoking . . . ) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against 
these dangers is one of the main investments of today’s ‘biopolitics.’ Solutions are here 
desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The 
main contender is ‘safe sex’—a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old 
saying ‘Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?’ The 
ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent ‘opium without 
opium’: no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it—it 
already IS a kind of ‘opium without opium’.
And the same holds for belief: we want others (our children, more primitive peo-
ple) to believe for us, instead of us. Therein resides the stake of today’s reference to 
‘culture,’ of ‘culture’ emerging as the central life-world category: we today no longer 
‘really believe,’ we just follow (some of the) religious rituals and mores as part of the 
respect for the ‘life-style’ of the community to which we belong (non-believing Jews 
obeying kosher rules ‘out of respect for tradition,’ etc.). ‘I do not really believe in it, it is 
just part of my culture’ effectively seems to be the predominant mode of the disavowed/
displaced belief characteristic of our times. What is a cultural life-style, if not the fact that, 
although we do not believe in Santa Claus, there is a Christmas tree in every house and 
even in public places every December? Perhaps, then, the ‘non-fundamentalist’ notion 
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of ‘culture’ as distinguished from ‘real’ religion, art, etc., IS in its very core the name for 
the field of disowned/impersonal beliefs—‘culture’ is the name for all those things we 
practice without really believing in them, without ‘taking them seriously.’ Is this not also 
the reason why science is not part of this notion of culture—it is all too real? And is this 
also not why we dismiss fundamentalist believers as ‘barbarians,’ as anti-cultural, as a 
threat to culture—they dare to take seriously their beliefs? Today, we ultimately perceive 
as a threat to culture those who immediately live their culture, those who lack a distance 
towards it. Recall the outrage when, two years ago, the Taliban forces in Afghanistan 
destroyed the ancient Buddhist statues at Bamiyan: although none of us enlightened 
Westerners believed in the divinity of Buddha, we were so outraged because the Taliban 
Muslims did not show the appropriate respect for the ‘cultural heritage’ of their own 
country and of all humanity. Instead of believing through the other like all people of 
culture, they really believed in their own religion and thus had no great sensitivity for 
the cultural value of the monuments of other religions—for them, the Buddha statues 
were just fake idols, not ‘cultural treasures.’
A reference to Goethe’s Faust can be of some help here: after they consummate their 
love in the intimacy of sexual act, Gretchen asks Faust the other intimate question, the 
famous ‘Nun sag, wie hast du’s mit der Religion?’—and Faust’s long-winded answer is a 
case of what Harry Frankfurt called bullshitting if there ever was one. He goes through 
all possible excuses and phrases to avoid a direct answer: (1) let’s forget about religion, 
we are now in the thrall of love; (2) I respect those who believe; (3) who can really say ‘I 
believe’?; (4) it is not that I don’t believe, but religion should be a matter of an ineffable 
deep feeling, not of confession, of words—‘Gefühl ist alles; Name ist Schall und Rauch’. 
. . . But it is not that Faust simply doesn’t believe: in a way he is sincere in his hypocrisy. 
This hypocrisy is rendered much more directly in Busoni, where Faust twice takes off 
his girdle, makes a circle on the ground with it, and then himself enters it.
In his wonderful essay on fetishist Verleugnung ‘Je sais bien, mais quand me^me…’4, 
Octave Mannoni refers to an anecdote from Casanova’s memoirs in order to explain the 
difference between the standard symbolic transferred belief and cynical (dis)belief. This 
anecdote also concerns the topic of entering a magic circle: Casanova reports how, in 
order to seduce a young uneducated peasant girl, he pretended to be a magician, marked 
on the ground a magic circle and claimed that this circle offers protection from all danger 
(his intention was, of course, to seduce the poor girl within this circle where she should 
have felt safe from danger). But then an unexpected thing happened: by pure accident, a 
wild storm suddenly broke out, and, struck by fear, Casanova quickly steps into his own 
magic circle to escape the danger. He knew very well that there is no magic here, that 
the magic power of the circle is his nonsense talk to cheat the girl—but nonetheless, once 
the real danger struck, he as it were got caught into his own illusion, he fell into his own 
trap—exactly like Busoni’s Faust who, at the opera’s end, when he accepts his fate, again 
makes the magic circle and steps into it—finally, he also gets caught into his own trap.
The distance of the cynical manipulator towards belief is not the same one as the 
‘normal’ distance towards what one says: when we greet an acquaintance with ‘How are 
4 In Octave Mannoni, Clefs pour l’imaginaire, Paris: Editions du Seuil 1968, p. 5-33.
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you? Nice to see you!,’ both of us also know very well that we did not mean it literally, 
that we just said it out of politeness. When we give Christmas presents to our children, 
neither we nor (probably) our children really believe that Santa Claus brought them, 
we just play the sincere game of pretending . . . . This is not what Faust is doing: he 
plays the same game with his Will as with his belief. He wants to believe without being 
engaged in it, he wants glauben, doch jede Verantwortung dafür refüsieren—er will 
seine Hände rein wahren, er sucht ein Andres to believe for him. The price he pays 
for his inauthenticity, for his cynical manipulation of belief is that he ends up stepping 
into his own circle.
Let us take a closer look at what kind of entity Faust is after he forfeits his autono-
mous Will in the contract with Mephistopheles. When the magic book is promised to 
Faust, he explodes in joy:
/ . . . /o, ihr Menschen, die ihr mich
gepeinigt, hütet euch vor Faust!
In seine Hand die Macht gegeben, heimliche
Gewalt ihm zu Gebot/. . . /
One should bear in mind here the literal meaning of ‘Faust’—there is a long tradition 
in popular culture of an ‘undead’ spectral organ starting to function on its own, inde-
pendently of the body to which it belongs, like the hand from early surrealist films up to 
David Fincher’s superb Fight Club. The truth, however, doesn’t fit this joyful image—in the 
nice scene in the first Bild which takes place in the Herzog’s park, Faust conjures three 
couples in order to amuse the noble public: Solomon and Sheba; Samson and Delilah; 
John the Baptist and Salome with the Baptist’s executioner. These scenes are, of course, 
fully contextual (or, rather, indexical): they are intended as allegories of the ongoing 
love affair between Faust himself and die Herzogin. This scene renders clear the core 
of Faust’s ‘magic’: he conjures mythical scenarios which stage (provide the coordinates 
of) the desires of the affected subjects—it is through this scene that the love-triangle is 
constituted and the Herzogin formulates her love for Faust. One should be very precise 
here: the conjured vision doesn’t only represent the growing desire of Faust and the 
Herzogin, it literally gives rise to it.
In the deal with Faust, Mephistopheles promises to serve him till his death, while 
Faust should serve him after his death, for all eternity. The paradox here is that Faust is 
horrified by this prospect, although he perceives his deal with Mephistopheles as the 
renunciation of all (Christian) Beyond:
Es gibt kein Erbarmen. Es gibt keine Seligkeit,
keine Vergeltung, den Miel nicht und nicht
die Höllenschrecken: dem Jenseits trotz’ ich!
There is no contradiction here: Faust doesn’t deny that there is a Beyond, he wants 
to live in defiance (or ignorance) of it, of the Afterlife—and he will have to pay the price 
for it in the afterlife. (Mephistopheles of course cheats here: as Faust realizes towards 
the end, he already paid the price fully in this life.) This Beyond is not so much the 
literal beyond of afterlife, but more what Jacques Lacan called the ‘big Other’: the ideal 
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agency which decides on the ultimate meaning of our acts, the agency to which we are 
responsible, which passes Judgment on our life, which settles the accounts of our life. 
(In this sense, even—and especially—the Stalinist Communists believed in a Beyond: 
the Beyond of History which decides about the true meaning of our acts.) For Faust, 
the bargain with Mephistopheles is precisely that there is keine Rechnung: he wants 
to ‘have his cake and eat it too,’ to have one’s wish without paying the price for it, as 
Mephistopheles’s first service to Faust makes it clear. Faust wants the soldier, Gretchen’s 
brother, liquidated:
‘ F: Räum ihn aus dem Wege. M: Auf deine Rechnung. F: Nein, ich will meine Hände 
rein wahren. Such ein Andres.’
And Mephistopheles does it: he finds a patrol of soldiers to do it. Faust is here the 
opposite of the Herzog’s Zeremonienmeister, who states his position when ordered by 
the Herzog to introduce Faust:
Wenn ihr befehlt, so will ich ihn präsentieren,
introduzieren, doch jede Verantwortung
refüsieren.
Faust, on the contrary, will befehlen, doch jede Verantwortung refüsieren. He wants 
to be master-servant: il n’y est pour rien. The price he pays is that he does not lead a full 
life, but is a lifeless shadow. The standard idealist question ‘Is there (eternal) life after 
death?’ should be countered by the materialist question: ‘Is there life before death?’ This 
is the question Wolf Biermann asked in one of his songs—what bothers a materialist is: 
Am I really alive here and now, or am I just vegetating, as a mere human animal bent 
on survival? This is also the Faust question, as Goethe knew—when, after the spectre of 
Helen whom he tries to embrace vanishes, Faust states in a resigned way:
Ich weiser Narr,
ich Säumer, ich Verschwender!
Nichts ist getan,
alles zu beginnen;
the point is precisely that he did not really live his life, but missed it. Faust confronts 
his defeat in the Zweites Bild, when Helen appears to him: ‘Was ich sehnte,/was ich waeh-
nte:/höchsten Wunsches/Rätselformen.’ When he tries to embrace her, enthusiastically 
exclaiming ‘Nur Faust berührte je das Ideal!,’ the vision disintegrates into nothing, and 
he accepts the bitter lesson: ‘Der Mensch ist der Volkommenen nicht gewachsen.’ (His 
conclusion is wrong: the lesson is rather that Helen is like rainbow, a pure appearance, 
something that is only visible from a proper distance.) At this moment, he knows that 
the game is over, that nothing was really done.
One should read these lines in their contrast to Goethe: what Faust here brutally 
experiences is that LA Femme n’existe pas—THE Woman, the substantial protecting 
Ground of the hero’s existence, not a particular woman but das Ewig-Weibliche welches 
zieht uns hinan, mentioned in the Chorus Mysticus which concludes Faust II (and was 
set to music in the second part of Mahler’s 8th Symphony, the exemplary late-Romantic 
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kitsch). These lines suggest the ineffable spiritual dimension of femininity which inspires 
men to realize their highest potential—an anti-feminist piece of wisdom, if there ever 
was one. That is to say, it is worth remembering here how Goethe’s Faust concludes: the 
aged Faust has satisfied a dream of activity and economic progress, he has reclaimed 
the land from the sea, peopled it, and given it prosperity. But his pleasure and pride are 
not complete: a freehold enclave held by an old couple, Philemon and Baucis, disturbs 
the unity of his estate. He asks Mephisto to remove them, and the consequence is the 
burning-down of their house and their murder. Delighted with the growth of his project, 
Faust, now one hundred years old, speaks a phrase of satisfaction,
Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück
Genieß’ ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick,
and falls back dead. Thereupon Mephisto steps in, claiming his own. Heavenly spirits, 
however, intervene, drive off Mephisto, and reclaim Faust. In the final mystical scene, 
Faust‘s soul is conveyed in a progress towards Heaven, amidst the intercessions of 
Gretchen and other women . . . . What one should not miss is the colonialist-imperialist 
aspect of Faust’s last years—Faust ends his life as a defiant capitalist, brutally disposing 
of the last obstacle, the owners of a free enclave . . . . This is how das Ewig-Weibliche 
zieht ihn hinan!
‘Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück/Genieß‘ ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick’—
does this not also hold for Busoni’s Faust’s last moment? The Glück here is in his aware-
ness of how, through the highest act of transposing his Will onto the child, he ‘stell ich 
mich/über die Regel/umfass in Einem/die Epochen/und vermenge mich/den letzten 
Geschlechtern:/ich, Faust/ein ewiger Wille.’ This is an existential lie, a false exit, which 
is why it is a sign of Busoni’s artistic authenticity that he wasn’t able to compose these 
lines. Which, then, is the precise character of this Wille?
When Busoni stages a series of transformations—of a child into Christ, of Christ into 
Helen of Troy, etc.—, what we should focus on is the mysterious stuff which lends itself 
to such transformations, the proverbial ‘stuff the dreams are made of.’ Lacan’s name for 
this stuff is objet petit a, the object-cause of desire. One should imagine this object as a 
weird organ which is magically autonomized, surviving without a body whose organ 
it should have been, like a hand that wonders around alone in early Surrealist films, 
or like the smile in Alice in Wonderland that persists alone, even when the Cheshire 
cat's body is no longer present; it is an entity of pure surface, without the density of a 
substance, an infinitely plastic object that can not only incessantly change its form, but 
can even transpose itself from one to another medium: imagine a ‘something’ that is 
first heard as a shrilling sound, and then pops up as a monstrously distorted body. It is 
indivisible, indestructible, and immortal—more precisely, undead in the sense this term 
has in horror fiction: not the sublime spiritual immortality, but the obscene immortality 
of the ‘living dead’ who, after every annihilation, re-compose themselves and clumsily 
go on. It does not exist, it insists: it is unreal, an entity of pure semblance, a multiplicity 
of appearances which seem to envelop a central void—its status is purely fantasmatic. 
This blind indestructible insistence of the libido is what Freud called ‘death drive,’ and 
one should bear in mind that ‘death drive’ is, paradoxically, the Freudian name for its 
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very opposite, for the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny 
excess of life, for an ‘undead’ urge which persist beyond the (biological) cycle of life 
and death, of generation and corruption. This is why Freud equates death drive with 
Wiederholungszwang, the uncanny urge to repeat painful past experiences which 
seems to outgrow the natural limitations of the organism affected by it and to insist 
even beyond the organism’s death—again, like the living dead in a horror film who just 
go on. This excess inscribes itself into the human body in the guise of a wound which 
makes the subject ‘undead,’ depriving him of the capacity to die (like the wound on the 
ill boy’s belly from Kafka’s ‘A Country Doctor’): when this wound is healed, the hero 
can die in peace. For any avid cinema-goer, it is difficult to avoid the feeling that he has 
already seen all this in Ridley Scott’s Alien: the monster appears indestructible; if one 
cuts it into pieces, it merely multiplies; it is something extra-flat that all of a sudden flies 
off and envelops your face; with infinite plasticity, it can morph itself into a multitude 
of shapes; in it, pure evil animality overlaps with machinic blind insistence. The ‘alien’ 
is effectively libido as pure life, indestructible and immortal—this is what Busoni refers 
to as eternal Will. Where, then, does the plasticity of this object come? Lacan’s solution 
is that all the figures of objet a are figures of the void, of nothingness. Human desire 
does not have a determinate object: every object is already metonymic, a place-holder 
of Nothing, when we get hold of it, our experience is the one of ce n’est pas ça, ‘this is 
not that (what I really wanted),’ no given object can satisfy my desire, its true object is 
the lost maternal Thing which is always missing, and objet a gives body to this void.
Perhaps the best way to describe the status of this inhuman drive is with reference 
to Kant’s philosophy. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduced a key distinction 
between negative and indefinite judgment: the positive statement ‘the soul is mortal’ 
can be negated in two ways. We can either deny a predicate (‘the soul is not mortal’), 
or affirm a non-predicate (‘the soul is non-mortal’). The difference is exactly the same 
as the one, known to every reader of Stephen King, between ‘he is not dead’ and ‘he 
is undead.’ The indefinite judgment opens up a third domain which undermines the 
distinction between dead and non-dead (alive): the ‘undead’ are neither alive nor dead, 
they are precisely the monstrous ‘living dead.’ And the same goes for ‘inhuman’: ‘he 
is not human’ is not the same as ‘he is inhuman.’ ‘He is not human’ means simply that 
he is external to humanity, animal or divine, while ‘he is inhuman’ means something 
thoroughly different, namely the fact that he is neither human nor inhuman, but marked 
by a terrifying excess which, although it negates what we understand as humanity, is 
inherent to being-human. And, perhaps, one should risk the hypothesis that this is what 
changes with the Kantian philosophical revolution: in the pre-Kantian universe, humans 
were simply humans, beings of reason, fighting the excesses of animal lusts and divine 
madness, while with Kant, the excess to be fought is immanent and concerns the very 
core of subjectivity itself. (Which is why, in German Idealism, the metaphor for the core 
of subjectivity is Night, the ‘Night of the World’, in contrast to the Enlightenment notion 
of the Light of Reason fighting the darkness around.)
A look at the Wagnerian heroes can be of some help here: from their first paradig-
matic case, the Flying Dutchman, they are possessed by the unconditional passion for 
dying, for finding ultimate peace and redemption in death. Their predicament is that, 
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some time in the past, they have committed some unspeakable evil deed, so that they 
are condemned to pay the price for it not by death, but by being condemned to a life of 
eternal suffering, of helplessly wandering around, unable to fulfill their symbolic func-
tion. This gives us a clue to the exemplary Wagnerian song, which, precisely, is the Klage 
of the hero, displaying his horror at being condemned to a life of eternal suffering, to 
err around or dwell as the ‘undead’ monster, longing for peace in death (from its first 
example, Dutchman’s great introductory monologue, to the lament of the dying Tristan 
and the two great complaints of the suffering Amfortas). Brünnhilde’s final farewell to 
him—‘Ruhe, ruhe, du Gott!’—points in the same direction: when the gold is returned to 
the Rhine, Wotan is finally allowed to die peacefully.
Wagner’s solution to Freud’s antagonism of Eros and Thanatos is thus the identity 
of the two poles: love itself culminates in death, its true object is death, the longing for 
the beloved is the longing for death. Is, then, this urge which haunts the Wagnerian hero 
what Freud called the ‘death drive/Todestrieb/’? It is precisely the reference to Wagner 
which enables us to see how the Freudian death drive has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the craving for self-annihilation, for the return to the inorganic absence of any life-
tension. Death drive does not reside in Wagner’s heroes’ longing to die, to find peace in 
death: it is, on the contrary, the very opposite of dying—a name for the ‘undead’ eternal 
life itself, for the horrible fate of being caught in the endless repetitive cycle of wander-
ing around in guilt and pain. The final passing-away of the Wagnerian hero (the death 
of the Dutchman, Wotan, Tristan, Amfortas) is therefore the moment of their liberation 
from the clutches of the death drive. Tristan in Act III is not desperate because of his 
fear of dying: what makes him desperate is that, without Isolde, he cannot die and is 
condemned to eternal longing—he anxiously awaits her arrival so as to be able to die. 
The prospect he dreads is not that of dying without Isolde (the standard complaint of 
a lover), but rather that of an endless life without her.
This weird ‘undead’ drive is not the same as the Schopenhauerian Wille—it is the 
gap that separates them which thwarts the planned triumphant conclusion of Busoni’s 
Faust. When, at the very end, Gnade and Versöhnung are denied to him, Faust fully ac-
cepts his destiny and does das höchste Tun of assuming death and transfiguration: he 
reappears (is reborn) as a naked half-grown youth with a flowering branch, into which 
his death child changes. How are we to read this ending? Mephistopheles’s line which 
closes the opera—‘Sollte dieser Mann etwa verunglückt sein?’—is not rhetorical, but liter-
ally a question, a dilemma. It is not principally the question of illusion or reality (is the 
young naked boy only the dying Faust’s hallucination, a mere illusion, or is he real?), i.e., 
it is too easy to say that for cynical realists there is no boy, just the miserable dead body 
of Faust, while those who believe in it see it. The question is a more radical one: real or 
not, is the appearance of the young boy an authentic vision or a fake way out?
And is this dilemma not reflected in the opera’s two endings? Busoni left the ending 
uncomposed, and the opera was first performed in 1925 with Phillip Jarnach’s ending, 
which makes no use of detailed musical instructions left by the dying Busoni (it is 
worth remembering that Busoni also left Helen’s appearance uncomposed). Anthony 
Beaumont’s later spacious final scene (first performed in 1984), realizing manuscript 
sketches as well as other original material from 1923 and 1924, is much more Busoni 
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making the opera’s final image Nietzschean: a naked youth rises from the ruined body of 
Faust, shucking off old and constraining superstitions. That white innocence, symbolic 
of Busoni’s yearning for a newborn classicism in the aftermath of World War I, is best 
expressed in the radiant key of C major, whereas Jarnach perversely forces it down to E 
flat minor, the blackest of all keys. This is the dilemma: C major or E flat minor?
But this dilemma was already that of Busoni himself—it is clear that the unfinished 
score of Faust is not just an external accident due to the composer’s illness and prema-
ture death, but the result of an inherent creative deadlock. Faust belongs to the great 
unfinished operas from the same epoch, from Puccini’s Turandot to Schoenberg’s Moses 
und Aaron and Berg’s Lulu—as Sergio Sablich put it: ‘The fact remains that Busoni didn’t 
compose this Finale because he didn’t succeed in finding the adequate musical solution.’ 
Something in him—his authentic artistic sense—resisted a triumphant finale in the style 
of the Wagnerian Verklärung which concludes Tristan. Musically, the declared triumph 
of the eternal Will remains a dead letter:
/. . . /so stell’ ich mich/über die Regel/umfass in Einem/die Epochen/und vermenge 
mich/den letzten Geschlechtern:/ich, Faust/ein ewiger Wille.
Busoni wrote: ‘I hope that Faust‘s fear can be discerned, the fear that makes him 
collapse unconscious at the end.’ But did he not himself shirk back from this fear in this 
concluding triumphant assertion of the Will?
So which version is better, Jarnach’s or Beaumont’s? One cannot but recall here Sta-
lin’s famous quip from 1928, when he was asked which deviation is worst, the Rightist 
or the Leftist: ‘They are both worse!’ The same holds here: Jarnach’s ‘Rightist’ version 
(which emphasizes the catastrophy of the ending) and Beaumont’s ‘Leftist’ version 
(which emphasizes the optimism of the Will) are both worse: they both miss the truth 
contained in the very fact that Faust remained incomplete. Our answer should thus be 
the obverse of the legendary Englishman’s reply to the offer ‘Coffee or tea?’: ‘Yes, please!’ 
This is why the decision to stage Faust the way it was left by Busoni, with the last sung 
words ‘Ich will wie ehemals aufschauen zu dir’ (addressed to Christ, just before his figure 
changes into that of Helen), is a profoundly correct one. In Jarnach’s standard version, 
Mephistopheles’s last line in spoken, like King Herod’s last line from Strauss’ Salome 
‘Man töte dieses Weib.’ If one performs as a spoken word everything that comes after 
‘Ich will wie ehemals aufschauen zu dir,’ one does not just show respect to the Master—
one does something much more radical: one turns around the Schopenhauerian eternal 
Will, Busoni’s point of reference.
It was Schopenhauer who claimed that music brings us in contact with the Ding an 
sich: it renders directly the drive of the life-substance that words can only signify. For 
that reason, music ‘seizes’ the subject in the real of his/her being, bypassing the detour 
of meaning: in music, we hear what we cannot see, the vibrating life-force beneath the 
flow of Vorstellungen. Recall the remarkable scene at the beginning of Sergio Leone’s 
Once Upon a Time in America, in which we see a phone ringing loudly, and, when a 
hand picks up the receiver, the ringing goes on—as if the musical life-force of the sound 
is too strong to be contained by reality and persists beyond its limitations. (Or recall a 
similar scene from David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive, in which a singer on stage sings 
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Roy Orbison’s »Crying«, and when she collapses unconscious, the song goes on.) What 
happens, however, when this flux of life-substance itself is suspended, discontinued? 
Georges Balanchine staged a short orchestral piece by Webern (they are all short) so 
that, after the music is over, the dancers continue to dance for some time in complete 
silence, as if they had not noticed that the music that provides the substance for their 
dance is already over—like the cat in a cartoon who simply continues to walk over the 
edge of the precipice, ignoring that she has no longer ground under her feet . . . . The 
dancers who continue to dance after the music is over are like the living dead who dwell 
in an interstice of empty time: their movements, which lack vocal support, allow us to 
see not only the voice but silence itself.
And something of the same kind happens when singers stop singing and start to 
perform like actors: we are confronted with mere words, deprived of their libidinal 
substance provided by music. What we hear are effectively dead words—words which 
we fully understand, but which nonetheless lack the proper subjective resonance. This 
reference to Balanchine also enables us to locate Busoni’s philosophical mistake: what 
he refers to as the eternal Wille, the immortal drive which persists through all its trans-
formations, is not really Schopenhauerian Wille; it is rather a persistence which goes on 
even when Wille disappears.
This, however, does not mean that such a staging only confronts us with Busoni’s 
failure: the musical deadlock should also be understood as a direct call to us, spectators, 
to provide the missing music—the choice is ours. In such a reading, the Christian dimen-
sion is still present: it is implicit in the fact that the God who rejects Faust’s redemption 
is explicitly designated by the Chorus as Gott ‘der Rache, der Vergeltung und der Strafe,’ 
nicht Gott ‘der Milde und der Gnade’—Faust turns towards ewiger Wille after the cruci-
fied morphs into Helen—it is to her apparition that he exclaims: ‘Verdammnis! Gibt es 
keine Gnade? Bust du unversöhnbar?’ Faust is thus abandoned by the God of Rache 
und Vergeltung—one can well imagine a devil passing by the dead Christ on the cross 
and making the same cynical remark: ‘Sollte dieser Mann etwa verunglückt sein?’ Is this 
misfortune all that there is to it, or is there a resurrection—the choice is ours, because 
Christ is not resurrected as a particular individual, but as the Holy Spirit, the collective 
of those who believe. The resurrected Christ is not an X which exists independently of 
our belief, he is nothing but our belief in him: the resurrected Christ is the bond of love 
which unites his followers.
Is then the reborn child nonetheless a figure of the resurrected Christ? One should 
ask here a na¨ ve but pertinent question: if Busoni wanted to return to the tradition of 
Puppenspiele, is there, in the narrative itself, a figure which stands for a puppet? This 
figure is, of course, the young boy who appears at the very end as the re-incarnation 
of Faust’s Wille. The motif of the innocent/asexual boy confronted by an ‘overripe’ 
sexualized mature woman has a long prehistory which reaches back to the fin-de-sie`cle 
emergence of the (self)destructive femme fatale. Of special interest here is ‘Language 
in the Poem,’ Heidegger’s seminal essay on Georg Trakl’s poetry, the only place where 
he approaches the topic of sexual difference:
A human cast, cast in one mold and cast away into this cast, is called a Geschlecht. 
The word refers to mankind as a whole as well as to kinship in the sense of race, 
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tribe, family—all of these in turn cast in the duality of the sexes. The cast of man’s 
‘decomposed form’ is what the poet calls the ‘decomposing’ kind. It is the genera-
tion that has been removed from its kind of essential being, and this is why it is the 
‘displaced’ kind.
What curse has struck this humankind? The curse of the decomposing kind is that 
the old human kinship has been struck apart by discord of Geschlechter. Each of the 
Geschlechter strives to escape from that discord into the unleashed turmoil of the 
always isolated and sheer wildness of the wild game. Not duality as such, the discord 
is the curse. Out of the turmoil of blind wildness it carries each kind into an irrecon-
cilable plot, and so casts it into unbridled isolation. The ‘fallen Geschlecht,’ so cleft 
in two, can on its own no longer find its proper cast. Its proper cast is only with that 
kind whose duality leaves discord behind and leads the way, as ‘something strange,’ 
into the gentleness of simple twofoldness following in the stranger’s footsteps.5
The undead pale-faced ethereal boy Elis (‘Elis in wonderland,’ one is tempted to add) 
stands for the gentle Sex, for the harmonious duality of the sexes, not their discord. The 
first thing to do here (and which is not done by Heidegger) is to situate this figure of a 
presexual boy into its context, whose first references are Edvard Munch’s paintings: is 
this ‘unborn’ fragile boy not the very terrified asexual figure of The Scream, or the figure 
squeezed between the two frames in his Madonna, the same foetus-like asexual figure 
floating among the droplets of sperm? The horror of this figure is not the Heideggerian 
Angst, but the suffocating Schrecken pure and simple. Perhaps the outstanding example 
of this confrontation of the asexual boy with the Woman are the famous shots, from 
the beginning of Ingmar Bergman’s Persona, of a preadolescent boy with large glasses, 
examining with a perplexed gaze the giant unfocused screen-image of a feminine face; 
this image gradually shifts to the close-up of what seems to be another woman who 
closely resembles the first one—yet another exemplary case of the subject confronted 
with the fantasmatic interface-screen.
In short, what Heidegger’s reading does not take into account is how the very op-
position between the asexual boy and the discordant Geschlecht is sexualized: the dis-
cordant Geschlecht is not neutral, but feminine, and the very apparent gender-neutrality 
of Elis makes him a boy. So when Heidegger claims that ‘the boyishness in the figure 
of the boy Elis does not consist in the opposite of girlishness. His boyishness is the 
appearance of his stiller childhood. That childhood shelters and stores within it the 
gentle two-fold of sex, the youth and the ‘golden figure of the maiden’,’6 he misses the 
key fact that sexual difference does not designate the two sexes of the human stock/
species, but, in this case, the very difference between the asexual and the sexual: the 
external difference (between the sexual and the asexual) is mapped onto the internal 
difference between the two sexes. Furthermore, what Heidegger (and Trakl) already 
hint at is that, precisely as pre-sexual, this innocent ‘undead’ child confronted with the 
overripe and overblown feminine body is properly monstrous, one of the figures of 
the Evil itself:
5 Martin Heidegger, “Language in the Poem,” On the Way to Language, New York: Harper & Row 1982, p. 170-171.
6 Op.cit., p. 174.
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Spirit or ghost understood in this way has its being in the possibility of both gentle-
ness and destructiveness. Gentleness in no way dampens the ecstasy of the inflam-
matory, but holds it gathered in the peace of friendship. Destructiveness comes from 
unbridled license, which consumes itself in its own revolt and thus is active evil. Evil 
is always the evil of a ghostly spirit.7
Perhaps, one should insert the figure of the resurrected boy from Busoni’s Faust 
into the series of similar figures from the horror stories a` la Stephen King to Trakl’s 
Elis: the ‘undead,’ white, pale, ethereal monstrous asexual child returning to haunt the 
adults. This ambiguity of the asexual boy, oscillating between angelic and demonic—the 
ambiguity which reproduces the ambiguity of a puppet between Kleist and Hoffmann, 
between angelic and mechanically-possessed, is what remains open and unexplored 
in Busoni.
And, perhaps, we can surmise that, if, at Faust’s end, the young boy were to utter a 
sound, it would have been something like the sound of the scream of the homunculus 
depicted in Munch’s most famous painting.
7 Op.cit., p. 179.
Povzetek
Busoni ignorira vse prejšnje operne verzije Fausta 
in vstopa v dialog s samim Goethejem, ki ga ima 
za najvišjo različico Fausta. S tem ko se vrača k 
tradiciji lutkovnih iger, gre Busoni nazaj od sim-
bola k alagoriji, od organske dramatske enovitosti 
k sosledju tableaux vivants. Busonijev Faust 
je mlanholična žaloigra, pri kateri posamične 
zmage že spremlja senca končnega poraza. Buso-
nijeva nedokončana partitura je rezultat lastnega 
ustvarjalnega zastoja ne pa zunanje naključje 
zavoljo skladateljeve zgodnje smrti. Dvoumnost 
v zvezi z mladim fantom, ki se ob koncu pojavi 
kot reinkarnacija Faustove volje pri Busoniju še 
ni bila reziskana.
